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Abstract
Recent works show that deep neural networks
trained on image classification dataset bias towards
textures. Those models are easily fooled by ap-
plying small high-frequency perturbations to clean
images. In this paper, we learn robust image
classification models by removing high-frequency
components. Specifically, we develop a differ-
entiable high-frequency suppression module based
on discrete Fourier transform (DFT). Combining
with adversarial training, we won the 5th place in
the IJCAI-2019 Alibaba Adversarial AI Challenge.
Our code is available online.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved state-of-the-art
performances on many tasks, such as image classifications.
However, DNNs have been shown to be vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks [Szegedy et al., 2014] [Goodfellow et al., 2015].
Adversarial attacks are carefully designed small perturbations
to clean data which significantly change the predictions of tar-
get models. The lack of robustness w.r.t adversarial attacks of
DNNs brings out security concerns.
In this paper, we focus on defending DNNs from adversar-
ial attacks for image classifications. Many algorithms have
been proposed to achieve this purpose. Roughly, those algo-
rithms fall into three categories:
• data preprocessing, such as JPEG compression [Das et
al., 2017] and image denoise [Xu et al., 2018].
• adding stochastic components into DNNs to hide gradi-
ent information [Athalye et al., 2018].
• adversarial training [Madry et al., 2018].
Data preprocessing or stochastic components are usually
combined with adversarial training since it is the most suc-
cessful defense algorithm.
Recent works show that deep neural networks trained on
image classification dataset bias towards textures which are
the high-frequency components of images [Geirhos et al.,
2019]. Meanwhile, researchers empirically find that the per-
turbations generated by adversarial attacks are also high-
frequency signals. This means DNNs are mainly fooled by
carefully designed textures. Those facts suggest that sup-
pressing high-frequency components of images is helpful to
reduce the effects of adversarial attacks and improve the ro-
bustness of DNNs. On the other hand, the basic informa-
tion on clean images will be retained when suppression high-
frequency components because it converges on low frequen-
cies. In this paper, we aim to develop a high-frequency sup-
pressing module which is expected to have the following
properties:
1. separability: it should suppress high-frequency compo-
nents while keep low-frequency ones.
2. efficiency: it should have low computational costs com-
pared with the standard DNNs.
3. differentiability: it should be differentiable which al-
lows to jointly optimize with adversarial training.
4. controllability: it should be easy to control the degree
of high-frequency suppression and the degree of how the
original images are modified (e.g. L2 distance).
Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) which maps images into
frequency domain is a good tool to achieve those goals. Based
on (inverse) DFT, we propose a high-frequency suppress-
ing module which has all those properties. We evaluate our
method in the IJCAI-2019 Alibaba Adversarial AI Challenge
[AAAC, ]. Our code is available on https://github.com/zzd1992/
Adversarial-Defense-by-Suppressing-High-Frequencies.
2 Method
2.1 High-frequency suppression
As mentioned earlier, suppressing high-frequency compo-
nents is helpful to reduce the effects of adversarial attacks
and improve the robustness of DNNs. Given an input image,
we transform it into frequency domain via DFT. Then we re-
duce the high-frequency components in frequency domain.
Finally, we transform the modified frequency image back to
time domain.
Formally, denote x ∈ RM×N as the input image and xˆ ∈
CM×N as its frequency representation.
xˆu,v =
M−1∑
a=0
N−1∑
b=0
xa,be
−j2pi( uM a+ vN b) (1)
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Figure 1: Cumulative spectrum energy for 5, 000 images of AAAC in (a) and for test images of CIFAR-10 in (b). Blue line for clean images
and orange line for adversarial perturbations.
To suppress the high-frequency components, we modify xˆ as
follows:
xˆ←M xˆ (2)
where M ∈ RM×N and  is element-wise multiplication.
M controls how different frequency is scaled. Intuitively,M
should close to 0 for high-frequency components and close to
1 for low-frequency ones. In this paper, we setM to a box
window with fixed radius r. That is
Mu,v =
{
1, 0 <= |u|, |v| <= r
0, else
(3)
To simplify the notation, we set M−u,· = MM−u,· and
M·,−v = M·,N−v . The overall function of our high-
frequency suppression module is
x← F−1 (MF(x)) (4)
where F means DFT. An image is processed by this module
and a standard DNN in order.
Now we analyze the properties of our proposed module.
separability: becauseM is a box window, high-frequency
components are completely removed and low-frequency ones
are perfectly reserved.
efficiency: the computational costs are dominated by DFT.
For an M × N (we suppose M >= N ) image, the time
complexity of DFT is O(MN log2M). In practice, DFT
of a color image is faster than a convolutional layer. Thus
the costs of our proposed module are cheap compared with
DNNs.
differentiability: DFT can be expressed in matrix form:
F(x) = FMxFN (5)
where FM ∈ CM×M is the so-called Fourier transform ma-
trix. Clearly, DFT is differentiable. Instead of an image pre-
processing method, this property makes it possible to inte-
grate our module into DNNs and optimize with adversarial
training jointly.
controllability: denote xo as the output of the proposed
module. Based on Parseval theory, we have
‖x− xo‖22 = ‖xˆ−M xˆ‖22 (6)
Thus the degree of high-frequency suppression and the L2
norm between the original image and the modified image are
easily controlled by varying r of the box window. For na-
ture images, spectral energy is converged on low-frequency
regions. Thus ‖x− xo‖2 is small enough even when most of
the frequency components are suppressed (r is small).
2.2 Adversarial training
The idea of adversarial training is optimizing DNNs w.r.t both
clean samples and adversarial samples.
min
w
{
L(fw(x), y) + β max‖δ‖<L(fw(x+ δ), y)
}
(7)
where f maps an image into classification probability, w is
the parameters of f and L is the cross-entropy loss. δ is ob-
tained by (iteratively) projected gradient descent (PGD). β
controls the tradeoff between clean samples and adversarial
samples.
Recently, [Zhang et al., 2019] propose a novel adversarial
training method called TRADES. TRADES is formalized as
follows:
min
w
{
L(fw(x), y) + β max‖δ‖<L(fw(x), fw(x+ δ))
}
(8)
Instead of minimizing the difference between fw(x+ δ) and
the true label, TRADES minimizes the difference between
fw(x+ δ) and fw(x) which encourages the output to be
smooth. In this paper, we use TRADES as the adversarial
training method because it has a better tradeoff between ro-
bustness and accuracy. Refer [Zhang et al., 2019] for more
information.
3 Experiments
We first analyze the statistics of clean images and adversarial
images in frequency domain. Then we evaluate the proposed
method in the IJCAI-2019 Alibaba Adversarial AI Challenge
(AAAC).
High-frequency suppression Adversarial training Model ensemble Score
× × × 2.0350
× √ × 9.9880√ × × 14.9736√ √ × 19.0510√ √ √
19.7531
Table 1: Ablation study for three strategies and their combinations.
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Figure 2: We show the trade-off between robustness and accuracy
with high-frequency suppression modules whose r are different. Ro-
bustness is measured by the score of AAAC.
In AAAC, models are evaluated by image classification
task for electric business. There are about 11, 000 color im-
ages from 110 classes for training. There are 550 images for
test. Given an image, the score of a defense model is calcu-
lated as follows:
score =
{
0, Py 6= y
mean(‖δ‖2), Py = y (9)
where Py is the predicted label. The final score is averaged
over all images and all black-box attack models. Note that
before computing the score, images are resized to 299× 299.
We use ResNet-18 as the DNN architecture for all experi-
ments. Our method is implemented with PyTorch.
3.1 Statistics in frequency domain
We analyze the statistics of clean samples and adversarial
samples in frequency domain. Specifically, we study the
distributions of cumulative spectrum energy (CSE) w.r.t fre-
quency. Given a 2D signal xˆ ∈ CM×N in frequecy domain,
we define CSE as follows:
CSE(r) =
r∑
i=−r
r∑
j=−r
xˆ∗i,jxˆi,j (10)
where r <= min(M,N)2 . We randomly select 5, 000 im-
ages from AAAC. We calculate the CSE score of each image
and average all scores. We also calculate the averaged CSE
score for the corresponding adversarial perturbations which
are generated by iteratively PGD. The results are shown in
Fig. 1(a). As we can see, CSE for clean images converges
on low-frequency regions while CSE for adversarial pertur-
bations is nearly uniform. Thus, when we suppress the high-
frequency components, the effects of adversarial attacks will
be significantly reduced while most of the information on
clean images will be retained. This is the main motivation
of our work.
We calculate CSE score for CIFAR-10, as shown in
Fig. 1(b). The distribution is similar to AAAC’s.
3.2 AAAC results
As analyzed earlier, when we remove the high-frequency
components, the model will be more robust w.r.t adversarial
attacks while the accuracy on clean images will be decreased.
We evaluate this phenomenon with different r without adver-
sarial training. The accuracy is obtained on 5, 000 validation
clean images and the robustness is measured by the score of
AAAC. We show the results in Fig. 2. As r decreased, the
robustness w.r.t adversarial attacks is substantially increased.
Then we do ablation study for three strategies and their
combinations: 1) the proposed high-frequency suppression
module; 2) adversarial training via TRADES; 3) ensembles
of models with different r. As we can see in Tab. 1, our pro-
posed module is even better than adversarial training in this
challenge and those two methods are complementary to each
other. The best score is obtained by ensembling models with
different r each of which is trained together with the proposed
module and adversarial training. We secure the 5th place in
this challenge (the score for the 1st solution is 20.13).
4 Conclusions and discussions
Motived by the difference of frequency spectrum distribu-
tions between clean images and adversarial perturbations, we
have proposed a high-frequency suppression module to im-
prove the robustness of DNNs. This module is efficient,
differentiable and easy to control. We have evaluated our
method in AAAC.
We list several directions or questions which are worth to
be further explored:
• Is it helpful to change the radius of box window dynam-
ically?
• Is it helpful to suppress the high-frequency components
of intermediate convolutional features?
• We evaluate our method for image classification. Does
this method work for other tasks or other kinds of data,
such as speech recognition?
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